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Conceptualising the role of knowledge in ‘acting on media’
Hilde C. Stephansen
Introduction
The media practice approach has been widely adopted among scholars of citizen 
and social movement media, and has proved a productive framework for analysing 
the social contexts in which media are produced, consumed and circulated. 
According to Couldry’s (2012: 35) widely adopted definition, media practices can be 
understood as “what people are doing in relation to media in the contexts in which 
they act”: this might include actions that are directly oriented to media, actions that 
involve media, and actions whose preconditions are media (Couldry 2012). 
Highlighting the ubiquity and embeddedness of media in contemporary social life, 
this definition encompasses a very broad range of practices, and the ethnographic 
openness it generates is a key strength of the media practice approach. Thus far, 
however, research within the media practice literature has focused primarily on the 
use and impact of media; “how actors use specific tools, platforms or devices and 
what consequences this use has for their ability to engage with politics” (Kubitschko 
2018: 631). Although this focus on what people do with media has generated 
important insights into the ways that activists use media to organise and mobilise, it 
does not capture the full range of practices involved in media activism. Though 
media activists use media for other substantive ends, they also mobilise around 
media, making media technologies, infrastructures and policies the explicit focus of 
their activism (Hackett & Carrol 2006; Milan 2013; Stein, Kidd & Rodríguez 2009; 
Stephansen 2017). Recognising the importance of media for social change 
struggles, media activists create autonomous alternatives to state and corporate 
media (Milan 2013), campaign to democratise existing media (Hackett & Carrol 
2006), and work to raise awareness about the political nature of media technologies 
(Kubitschko 2015). Such media-focused activism is not new – it dates back at least 
to the 1970s and the NWICO (New World Information and Communication Order) 
debates within UNESCO – but it arguably takes on increased urgency and 
significance in an age of ‘deep mediatization’ (Couldry & Hepp 2017). As activists 
increasingly mobilise around media, we need to expand the definition of media 
practices to include practices aimed at thematising, problematising and politicising 
media and communication. 
The term ‘acting on media’ has been proposed (Kubitschko & Kannengiesser 2017; 
Kubitschko 2018) as a way to capture the wide range of practices that make media 
technologies and infrastructures sites of political struggle. “Acting on media denotes 
the efforts of a wide range of actors to take an active part in the molding of media 
organizations, infrastructures and technologies that are part of the fabric of everyday 
life” (Kannengiesser & Kubitschko 2017: 1). Kubitschko (2018: 631) cites examples 
ranging from citizen media to data activism (Milan and van der Velden 2016), Repair 
Cafés where people fix everyday media objects (Kannengiesser 2017), and hacker 
practices that involve modifying and deconstructing media technologies. Taking up 
Couldry’s key question, “how is people’s media-related practice related […] to their 
wider agency?” (2012: 37), Kubitschko (2018: 632) argues that the concept of ‘acting 
on’ media needs to be incorporated as “a central analytical dimension of media as 
practice research”.
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The conceptual reorientation offered by ‘acting on media’ opens up media practice 
research to a wider range of practices beyond those that involve doing things with 
media. In what follows, I further draw out the implications of this conceptual move by 
problematising the role of knowledge in media practices. While, arguably, many 
media practices are so embedded in everyday life as to be largely habitual and 
unreflexive, ‘acting on media’ involves the “articulation of viewpoints, interests, 
experiences and knowledge” (Kubitshcko 2018: 633). Citizen media practices 
(Stephansen 2016), which are our concern in this volume, involve “act[ing] in public 
space(s) to effect aesthetic or socio-political change” (Baker & Blaagaard 2016: 16). 
They are intentional and involve mobilising knowledge: about specific technologies, 
about the wider media environment, about other actors in the field, and more. If we 
expand the concept of ‘media practices’ to include practices that thematise and 
politicise media, we need to consider the role of knowledge in such practices. 
The aim of this chapter is to critically explore how we might understand the role of 
knowledge in media practices – particularly those that involve ‘acting on’ media. As I 
show in the first section, knowledge has been conceptualised as integral to media 
practices. However, as I go on to discuss, knowledge has a contested status among 
practice theorists, who reject the ‘mentalism’ and rationalist assumptions of much 
modern social thought. While some see practices as governed largely by tacit ‘know-
how’ and skill, others insist on the importance of perceptions, reasons and 
propositional knowledge. Siding with the latter, I argue that knowledge is a core 
dimension of media practices, but that activities such as theorising, reflecting and 
analysing should themselves be treated as social practices rather than subjective 
mental activities (Schmidt 2016). Thus conceived, ‘knowledge practices’ can be 
analysed as an important dimension of media practices. In the latter parts of the 
chapter, I draw on literature on knowledge production in social movements to 
develop a framework for analysing such knowledge practices, and illustrate the utility 
of this framework through a brief case study of the World Forum of Free Media, a 
global gathering of NGOs and activist groups that mobilise around media and 
communication. 
Knowledge in the media practice literature
The literature on media practices already offers some resources for conceptualising 
the role of knowledge. Couldry (2004: 121) suggested that media practice research 
involves posing two key questions: “what types of things do people do in relation to 
media? And what types of things do people say in relation to media?” – adding in a 
footnote that this also implies “studying what people believe and think” (ibid.). 
Couldry’s (2004: 124) core question– “what types of things do people do/say/think 
that are oriented to media?”– clearly, then, includes a concern with cognitive 
processes. Cognitive processes also figure prominently in Mattoni’s definition of 
‘activist media practices’ as “both routinized and creative social practices that […] 
draw on how media objects and media subjects are perceived and how the media 
environment is understood and known” (2012: 159, emphasis added). More 
specifically, Mattoni makes the point that activist media practices “rest on the 
production of perceptions and knowledge about the broader context in which and 
with which social actors interact” (2012: 66). She goes on to define ‘media 
knowledge practices’ – practices “related to the development of knowledge about the 
media environment” (ibid.) – as a central component of activist media practices. 
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Mattoni shows how activists construct ‘semantic maps’ of the media environment as 
they decode media texts, engage in their own media production, and interact with 
journalists and other media subjects. Media knowledge practices thus “play an 
important role in shaping interactions between social movement actors and the 
media environments in which they are embedded” (Mattoni 2013: 48). 
McCurdy (2013) similarly argues that activists’ media practices are informed by ‘lay 
theories of media’: “theories or understandings, expressed and/or enacted by social 
movement actors, concerning the functions and motivations of news media, how 
news media operate, what drives them, and theories concerning how the logic of 
news influences the representation of reality” (2013: 62). McCurdy suggests that 
such lay theories of media, which are often informed by academic theories, can be 
situated as part of the ‘background knowledge’ (Reckwitz 2002) informing a broader 
practice of activism. Like Mattoni, McCurdy points out that activists’ knowledge of 
media is informed by their experiences both as audiences and producers of media: 
this knowledge “reflexively informs and translates to media-oriented practices” (2013: 
69). 
These perspectives resonate with research that has explored the role of political 
cultures and imaginaries in media activism (Barassi 2015; Barassi & Treré 2012; 
Fotopoulou 2017; Juris 2008; Kavada 2013; Treré, Jeppesen & Mattoni 2017; Treré 
2018; Wolfson 2014). A key insight to be drawn from this literature is that activists’ 
media imaginaries – the ways in which they perceive and imagine digital media 
technologies –, together with their broader political visions and ideals, contribute to 
shaping political cultures, organisational structures, and media practices (Barassi 
2015; Treré et al 2017; Treré 2018). As empirical research has shown, the ways in 
which activists imagine and perceive digital technologies have “material 
consequences for political practice” (Treré 2018: 144). For example, Juris (2008) and 
Wolfson (2014) show, from different perspectives, how ideals of horizontality and 
networked participation – derived from widely shared beliefs about the internet – 
came to constitute a powerful political ‘logic’ within the Global Justice Movement. 
Barassi (2015) shows how cultural variations in media imaginaries among activist 
groups in Spain, Italy and the UK inspired different social media practices, while 
Fotopoulou (2017) shows how the media practices of feminist groups are differently 
shaped by widely circulating social imaginaries of connectivity, participation and 
networked politics.
There is considerable overlap between this literature and the previously outlined 
approaches, which focus explicitly on the role of knowledge in media practices. As I 
discuss below, imaginaries figure among the mental activities that many practice 
theorists see as integral to practices, and form part of the broad understandings of 
‘knowledge’ deployed by social movement scholars. Without digressing into an 
extended discussion of definitions, we might conceptualise ‘knowledge’ here as a 
broader category that includes values and imaginaries as well as analytical and 
reflexive knowledge, knowledge about social relations, and practical know-how. 
Knowledge, in other words, can be understood as the “broader cognitive praxis that 
informs all social activity” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 49). Together, these 
perspectives make clear that we cannot study what activists do with media without 
also exploring the various forms of knowledge that underpin their media practices. 
They show that media practices involve not just the tacit know-how required to use 
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media, but also imaginaries and analytical knowledge. The relevance of the latter 
forms of knowledge is accentuated by practices that make media explicit objects of 
struggle. These kinds of media practices clearly involve knowledge production – 
about ‘media-related injustice’ (Milan 2013), media policy, and media institutions, to 
name a few – and they are usually informed by broader visions of social change 
based on shared values and ideals. 
Knowledge in practice theory
From a practice theory perspective, however, this focus on knowledge and 
intentionality raises complex questions regarding subjectivity, the relationship 
between structure and agency, and social change. While most practice theorists 
agree that practices involve some form of knowledge, its exact role and nature is 
contested. There is basic agreement that practices depend on shared skills and 
understanding (Schatzki 2001: 12), and definitions of practice typically include 
reference to practical know-how and embodied capacities. Summarising widely 
shared understandings, Schatzki defines practices as “embodied, materially 
mediated arrays of human activity centrally organised around shared practical 
understanding” (2001: 11). Spaargaren et al (2016: n.p.), in an introductory text, 
define social practices as “shared, routinized, ordinary ways of doings and sayings 
enacted by capable human agents who – while interacting with the material elements 
that co-constitute the practice – know what to do next in a non-discursive, practical 
manner”. In these definitions, the emphasis is on tacit, practical and embodied 
‘know-how’ – the largely unreflexive forms of knowledge that enable social actors to 
‘go on’ within any given social situation and perform routine social practices with skill. 
But how might we understand the role of more reflexive forms of knowledge in social 
practices? Practice theorists differ on this question. While for Bourdieu, the practical 
understanding and embodied norms implied by the concept of habitus provide a 
sufficient basis for explaining social reproduction, others emphasise the importance 
of perceptions, goals, reasons and propositional knowledge (Schatzki 2001). Barnes 
(2001), who argues that practice, by itself, forms an insufficient basis for explaining 
social life, conceptualises such forms of knowledge as extrinsic to social practices: “It 
is always necessary to ask what disposes people to enact the practices they do, how 
and when they do; and their aims, their lived experience and their inherited 
knowledge will surely figure amongst the factors of interest here” (2001: 29-30). 
Others incorporate reflexive and motivational knowledge as part of broader 
definitions of practice that recognise the role of cultural meanings and socially 
shared bodies of knowledge. Reckwitz (2002: 249) defines practice as 
a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of 
understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge.
Along similar lines, Shove, Pantzar and Watson (2012: 12) develop an 
understanding of practices as consisting of three main elements: materials (objects, 
technologies, tangible physical entities), competences (skill, know-how and 
technique), and meanings (symbolic meanings, ideas and aspirations). 
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The contested status of knowledge and intentionality can be linked to practice 
theory’s rejection of rationalist traditions that explain action and social order by 
reference to the motivation and reasoning of individuals. Having emerged as an 
attempt to chart a middle ground between methodological individualism and holism, 
practice theory rejects the voluntarism and ‘mentalism’ associated with such 
approaches, while at the same time seeking to avoid the constrictions of structuralist 
models. “Whereas philosophers and social investigators once cited mental entities 
such as beliefs, desires, emotions, and purposes, practice theorists instead highlight 
embodied capacities such as know-how, skills, tacit understanding, and dispositions” 
(Schatzki 2001: 16). Shifting the focus away from individuals, their backgrounds and 
motivations, practice theory instead turns attention towards the practices they 
engage in (Spaargaren 2016) and conceptualises the social as “a field of embodied, 
materially interwoven practices centrally organized around shared practical 
understandings” (Schatzki 2001: 12). Prioritising practices over mind, practice theory 
sees intelligibility, meaning and purpose as features of practices themselves rather 
than located in the minds of individuals (Schatzki 2001). According to Reckwitz, 
individuals act as ‘carriers’ of practices – i.e. as carriers not only of “patterns of bodily 
behaviour, but also of certain routinized ways of understanding, knowing how and 
desiring” (2002: 250). Such ‘mental’ activities are therefore better understood as 
qualities of practices rather than of the individuals that participate in such practices 
(Reckwitz 2002: 250). 
This emphasis on practices rather than individual mental activities implies a 
transformed understanding of knowledge. From a practice perspective, knowledge 
and truth “are no longer automatically self-transparent possessions of minds” but 
rather “mediated by interactions between people and by arrangements in the world” 
(Schatzki 2001: 20-21). Practice theory, in brief, seeks to account for knowledge by 
placing it decisively in the social realm, and conceptualising it as intrinsically bound 
up with material practices and relations. However, some (e.g. Schmidt 2016) argue 
that this ontological and epistemological reorientation has led to a neglect among 
practice theorists of the mental features (such as sense-making and reflexive, 
analytical knowledge) that are bound up with practice. To understand “precisely how 
reflexive, analytical and theoretical knowledge processes contribute to practices” 
(Schmidt 2016: n.p.) practice theory needs to make theoretical and analytical 
practices themselves the object of empirical-praxeographic research (ibid.). Activities 
such as analysing, reflecting and theorising should thus be treated not as subjective 
mental activities but rather as “empirically accessible, observable sets of 
organised doings and sayings (Schatzki) that are intertwined with artefacts and 
technologies” (Schmidt: n.p.). In other words, knowledge production should itself be 
treated as a social practice. Returning to the topic of citizen media practices, this 
means asking questions about how media-related knowledge is produced, what 
kinds of knowledge is produced (and by whom), and how such knowledge is 
mobilised to effect change. Some useful conceptual resources for asking these 
questions can be found in a growing literature on knowledge production in social 
movements.
Knowledge practices in social movements
One of the first (and theoretically most comprehensive) accounts of social 
movements as sites for knowledge production is Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) 
Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach. Operating with a view of knowledge 
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production as a fundamentally social endeavour, and emphasising the creative role 
of consciousness and cognition in all human action, Eyerman and Jamison see 
social movements as privileged agents in the social production of knowledge: as 
breeding grounds for innovations in thought and bearers of new ideas, which are 
subsequently diffused in wider society. The significance of a social movement thus 
lies in the historical project it articulates at the level of ideas. Eyerman and Jamison 
advocate studying social movements as ‘cognitive praxis’, which means focusing on 
the collective processes of knowledge production through which the identity of a 
movement is articulated and thinking about the contribution they make in the long 
term to human knowledge and the civilizational paradigms that guide human action. 
Such an understanding of social movements as sites for knowledge production has 
been taken up in more recent scholarship, which sees studying knowledge 
production in social movements as crucial to understanding their broader social 
significance and political ‘effects’ (Casas-Cortés et al 2008; della Porta & Pavan 
2017). Social movements are conceptualised as privileged sources of knowledge 
because they “have long been bearers of knowledge about forms of oppression and 
injustice” (Chesters 2012: 153) that is not accessible from dominant viewpoints and 
are uniquely placed to develop critiques of – and alternatives to – the current social 
order to effect social change (Chesters 2012; Cox 2014). 
The relevance of such approaches for theorising citizen media and practice lies in 
their understanding of knowledge as practice. Casas-Cortés et al (2008: 19) use the 
hyphenated term ‘knowledge-practices’ to emphasise the “concrete, embodied, lived, 
and situated” character of knowledge. Knowledge-practices refers to the “creation, 
modification and diverse enactments” of movement knowledges, which might take 
the form of “stories, ideas, narratives, and ideologies, but also theories, expertise, as 
well as political analyses and critical understandings of particular contexts” (Casas-
Cortés et al 2008: 20). Similarly, della Porta and Pavan define the concept of 
‘repertoires of knowledge practices’as
the set of practices that foster the coordination of disconnected, local, and 
highly personal experiences and rationalities within a shared cognitive system 
able to provide movements and their supporters with a common orientation for 
making claims and acting collectively to produce social, political, and cultural 
changes. (2017: 300)
A common argument within this literature is that what makes movement knowledges 
unique and politically important is their situated, material and place-based nature 
(Casas-Cortés et al 2008; Cox 2014; della Porta & Pavan 2017). Grounded in 
everyday experiences of inequality, oppression and struggle against the status quo, 
movement knowledges are often contrasted to more abstract and ‘objective’ forms of 
knowledge produced by academics and policy experts, who seek to establish 
categories, patterns and generalities (Esteves 2008). From a postcolonial 
perspective, Santos (2006) conceptualises the diversity of knowledges produced by 
the world’s social movements as expressive of an ‘epistemology of the South’. 
Challenging the universalism and abstraction of Western modern thought and the 
subalternisation of alternative knowledges wrought by histories of colonialism, the 
epistemology of the South asserts the validity and existence of a global ‘ecology’ of 
knowledges as well as the potential for translation and partial connection between 
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them. This is not to say that movements only produce situated and place-based 
knowledge – they also engage in the production of more abstract analytical 
knowledge including technical/scientific expertise – but that if we are to take 
movements seriously as knowledge producers, we need to value the situated and 
contextual character of their knowledge production in its own right (Chesters 2012). 
To better understand the diverse forms that movement knowledge practices might 
take – and in turn be able to analyse the different forms of knowledge practices 
involved in ‘acting on media’ – it is useful to review different typologies of movement 
knowledge. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) identify three dimensions of the 
‘knowledge interests’ of social movements. The cosmological dimension refers to a 
movement’s basic assumptions or beliefs – its fundamental worldview. The 
technological dimension relates to specific topics of protest and alternative 
technologies, and can also incorporate new institutions created by movements (Cox 
2014). The organisational dimension relates to a movement’s organisational 
paradigm, i.e. knowledge about strategies and tactics, how to mobilise – in brief, how 
to ‘do’ social movements. 
Adopting a slightly different angle, della Porta and Pavan (2017) propose three 
categories of knowledge production within social movements. The first, knowledge 
about the collective self, is concerned with the construction of a collective subject 
and is produced through activists’ collective self-reflection, often during events such 
as social forums and protest camps. The second, knowledge about the action 
network, involves “the effort of creating ‘strategic collectivities’ by fostering the 
circulation of information about diverse agendas, competences, and resources, thus 
generating large-scale and coordinated networks of strategic action and 
collaboration between different movements or parts of them” (della Porta & Pavan 
2017: 306). The third, knowledge as production of (political) alternatives, involves 
knowledge practices “oriented to develop critique of the status quo and substantiate 
alternative proposals to overcome it” (ibid.: 307). 
Integrating these schemes, the following typology of knowledge produced by social 
movements can be constructed:i 
1. Worldview. This category corresponds to Eyerman and Jamison’s 
cosmological dimension and refers to the kinds of knowledge production 
involved in the creation of a movement’s broad vision and worldview.
2. Knowledge about collective identity. This refers to practices of knowledge 
production involved in collective identity formation. It corresponds to della 
Porta and Pavan’s ‘knowledge about the collective self’, but also incorporates 
elements of their second category, ‘knowledge about the action network’, as 
knowledge about the actors that form part of wider networks beyond a 
movement’s immediate milieu is arguably also central to processes of 
collective identity formation (Melucci 1996).
3. Organisational knowledge. This incorporates Eyerman and Jamison’s 
organisational dimension and elements of della Porta and Pavan’s ‘knowledge 
about the action network’. It refers to knowledge about mobilization and 
strategy, as well as the organisational structures of the movement itself. 
4. Knowledge about alternatives. This final category incorporates Eyerman and 
Jamison’s technological dimension and della Porta and Pavan’s ‘knowledge 
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as production of (political) alternatives’. It can take different forms, ranging 
from forms of knowledge production that involves expert or analytical 
knowledge, such as the creation of alternative technologies and policy 
proposals, to more embodied forms of knowledge involved in prefigurative 
politics. 
Knowledge practices in the World Forum of Free Media
To illustrate how this typology might be used to analyse knowledge involved in 
‘acting on media’, I draw on a case study of the World Forum of Free Media (FMML, 
for the Portuguese Fórum Mundial de Mídia Livre and its French/Spanish 
equivalents), a thematic forum for media activists and media advocacy organisations 
linked to the World Social Forum (WSF).ii The FMML was first held in 2009 in 
conjunction with the WSF in Belém, Brazil and there have since been four further 
global editions (Rio de Janeiro 2012, Tunis 2013 and 2015, Montréal 2016) 
alongside a number of regional meetings. The FMML emerged out of a longer history 
of media activism within the WSF, which since 2001 has provided a space for media 
activists from around the world to gather, exchange knowledge and experience, and 
produce collaborative coverage of forum events. Though activists were initially 
concerned primarily with the production of alternative media content, the physical co-
presence afforded by the WSF also encouraged political debate. Since media 2003, 
media activists have organised seminars and workshops at every WSF to discuss 
issues such as internet governance, freedom of speech, alternative technologies and 
community media. The FMML has emerged out of this process, providing a thematic 
forum dedicated to media and technology issues. Over its five editions, it has 
brought together hundreds of very diverse participants – ranging from citizen media 
producers and tech activists to media reform groups, development NGOs and 
academic researchers – all of whom have in common that they seek to thematise 
and politicise media. The FMML is therefore a highly appropriate case study for 
analysing knowledge practices involved in ‘acting on media’. 
The typology outlined above provides a useful tool for analysing the diverse kinds of 
knowledge involved in FMML participants’ media practices. Knowledge about 
alternatives is produced in several ways. First, the FMML provides a space for 
activists to experiment with and share knowledge about media technologies. At most 
editions, hackers and tech activists have organised hacklabs – spaces dedicated to 
hands-on experimentation with, and knowledge sharing about, technologies ranging 
from lo-fi FM radio transmitters to alternative social media. The FMML also regularly 
hosts seminars about alternative technologies. Second, several forum participants 
are engaged in media policy advocacy, and use the FMML as a space to discuss 
and share policy alternatives.. Third, many FMML participants work actively, on an 
everyday basis, to construct new institutions in the form of alternative, citizen and 
community media based on principles of co-operation, participation and non-
hierarchical organisation. 
The FMML also provides a site for the production of organisational knowledge. It 
offers a space for participants to share knowledge about strategy and mobilization, 
whether through informal conversations or organised activities – thus enabling 
participants to build knowledge about ‘what works’ and expand their repertoires of 
contention.  The FMML also enables members of the organising committee to gain 
knowledge about how to mobilize at a global scale, ranging from awareness of the 
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need for cultural and linguistic translation to technical knowledge about the use of 
videoconferencing software for online meetings. The FMML also acts as a laboratory 
for experimentation with non-hierarchical ways of organising media production, 
giving activists concrete experience of ‘another communication’. 
As a global gathering of media activists from different cultural and political 
backgrounds, who work in diverse contexts, the FMML has played a fundamental 
role in supporting the production of knowledge about collective identity (see 
Stephansen 2017 for a detailed analysis of collective identity in the FMML). 
Successive face-to-face gatherings have enabled participants to get to know one 
another and develop mutual recognition through “knowledge production about the 
shared characteristics, principles and aims of ‘free media’” (Stephansen 2017: 62). 
Alongside these more organic processes of collective identity formation, FMML 
organisers have also engaged in deliberate efforts to develop a shared definition of 
‘free media’ – which has involved working across cultural and linguistic boundaries to 
arrive at a plural, inclusive definition (Stephansen 2017). One of the ways that they 
have done so is through the creation of the World Charter of Free Media (World 
Forum of Free Media, 2015), which was adopted in 2015 following a two-year 
consultation process via online forums and face-to-face meetings. The process of 
negotiating the Charter was explicitly conceived by organisers as an effort to create 
knowledge about collective identity: as one organiser suggested in 2013, “I think this 
[negotiating the Charter] is going to help us define and identify ourselves” (quoted in 
Stephansen 2017: 62). Accordingly, the Charter opens with a statement of who ‘we’ 
– free media – are, which appears as an attempt to set out a comprehensive 
definition:
We are communicators, activists, journalists, hackers, community media 
associations and free media, social movements and popular organizations. 
We are bloggers, audiovisual producers, free and open technology 
developers, associations, networks, unions, journalism schools, research 
centers on information and communication, and NGOs supporting access to 
information and communication. 
The Charter also provides insights into the worldview – or worldviews – that 
signatories hold, and its construction can be viewed as a process of knowledge 
production about the FMML’s vision. At a basic level, this worldview is succinctly 
expressed by the statement in one of its opening paragraphs: “democratization and 
the right to communicate for all are essential if we are to build a just and sustainable 
world”. FMML participants share a broad vision of media democratization as 
essential to social justice and an understanding of media and communication as 
political issues. Beyond this broad general vision, however, the Charter is also 
evidence of processes of knowledge production that involve efforts to consolidate 
different visions. As Eyerman and Jamison (1991) pointed out, the development of a 
movement’s cosmology always draws on the visions and knowledge of previous 
mobilizations, and this is also true in the case of the FMML. In a detailed analysis of 
the Charter (Stephansen 2017), I have shown that this document is in fact a 
composite of different worldviews: the Charter brings together several different ways 
of framing free media, with different historical and political trajectories. These include 
a ‘right to communicate’ frame, which draws on human rights discourse and can be 
traced back to previous international mobilizations such as the Communication 
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Rights in the Information Society campaign in the early 2000s and the NWICO 
debates in the 1970s and 1980s; frames that emphasise the media’s role in 
supporting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, which can be linked to the 
WSF’s ideals of horizontality and respect for epistemic plurality; and a social justice 
frame that locates media activism within broader struggles against colonialism, 
racism, sexism and other forms of oppression (Stephansen 2017). The development 
of the Charter has involved a process of knowledge production aimed at 
consolidating these different visions. 
Conclusion
The value of the typology of social movement knowledge proposed here is that it 
offers analytical purchase on the range of knowledge practices involved in ‘acting on 
media’. While it is not a typology of how knowledge is produced, but rather a 
typology of different forms of knowledge, it provides a lens through which a range of 
seemingly disparate practices – organising a seminar about media policy, working 
collaboratively to produce media content, negotiating a joint declaration, etc. – can 
be analysed as knowledge practices. A key argument in this chapter has been that 
such knowledge practices should be conceptualised as integral to media practices – 
especially those that involve thematising and politicising media – and that media 
practice researchers should make knowledge practices an explicit focus of their 
analysis. While much media practice research has focused on the habitual and 
unreflexive nature of everyday media use, citizen media practices involve intentional 
efforts to effect change and, arguably, a greater degree of reflexive and analytical 
knowledge, as well as creativity. A focus on knowledge practices is therefore 
important for our broader understanding of agency in the context of citizen media. 
By analysing knowledge practices in this way, media practice researchers will be 
better placed to address questions about how citizen media practices might 
contribute to social change. A common criticism of practice theory is that it is better 
at accounting for social reproduction than it is at explaining social change (Shove et 
al 2012). If, as in some versions of practice theory, individuals are conceptualised as 
carriers of practices, and practices conceptualised as routinized forms of behaviour, 
how can we account for innovation? Part of the answer to this question lies in Shove 
et al’s (2012: Ch. 7) insight that “[p]ractices change when new elements are 
introduced or when existing elements are combined in new ways”. I would add that in 
order to understand how and why such instances of recombination occur, it is 
essential to understand the knowledge practices that underpin them. The literature 
on knowledge production in social movements suggests that we should look to 
media activists as sources of new ideas and innovation in media practices. 
Taking social movements seriously as knowledge producers also involves rethinking 
the hierarchies of academic knowledge production, which position movement 
activists and their media practices as objects of knowledge to be analysed by 
academic researchers. If we conceptualise media activists as reflexive and 
knowledgeable agents, academic researchers cannot claim to occupy a privileged 
vantage point for analysing their media practices. Instead, we need to develop our 
analyses in conversation with activists, treating them not just as sources of 
ethnographic data but as interlocutors with a distinct contribution to make to our 
understanding of contemporary media practices. This involves developing an ethics 
of engagement and co-production of knowledge (Chesters 2012) and opening up the 
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canon of (Western) academic knowledge to the critical perspectives offered by 
movements of marginalised and oppressed groups (Cox 2014).
A focus on knowledge practices has been introduced in this chapter to rectify the 
relative lack of attention to cognitive processes within the media practice literature – 
and practice theory more generally. While the ethnographic openness that results 
from asking what people do with media has produced important insights into the 
ways that citizens use media to organise, campaign and gain visibility, my argument 
has been that it is important to also pay attention to the different forms of knowledge 
that underpin their media practices. As discussed above, such an understanding of 
knowledge as integral to agency does not necessitate a return to the mentalism and 
voluntarism that practice theory has sought to refute. By treating activities like 
theorising, analysing and reflecting about media as practices, rather than as 
subjective mental processes located in the minds of individuals, knowledge 
production can be situated decisively within the social realm as a material and 
embodied set of practices and subjected to empirical research. This is an important 
task for media practice scholars, working in collaboration with media activists. 
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